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OPINION 
_____________________                              
      
SMITH, Circuit Judge.  
In August of 1996, a jury found Maurice Richardson guilty of the March 26, 
1994 murder of Officer Steven Hodge. On this direct appeal, he challenges his 
convictions on constitutional and evidentiary grounds. We will affirm. 
I 
 Officer Hodge’s murder took place shortly after 11:00 pm on March 26, 
1994. He was shot fourteen times by at least two people using four different guns. 
Police found only one piece of physical evidence at the scene, a towel with gun 
residue. It was found near a bush close to Officer Hodge’s home and appeared to 
have been recently placed there.  
 Richardson confessed to Athnell Coker that he was involved in the murder. 
Richardson’s confession included an explanation of how the murder took place: it 
was an ambush, he had hidden behind some bushes, and he had shot Officer Hodge 
while he was lying on the ground. Additionally, Richardson gave Coker a sawed-
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off shotgun with duct tape on the handle that he and Coker buried together in 
Coker’s backyard. Coker later gave this shotgun to persons sent by Richardson. 
 Besides Coker’s testimony recounting Richardson’s confession, the other 
testimony revealed that the murder was the product of a conspiracy among 
Richardson and his codefendants. On the day of the murder, Gwentin Sellwood 
saw three of Richardson’s codefendants—Gent Mosby, Carl Fleming, and Ricky 
Vanterpool—at a store Mosby ran called New York’s Latest Fashions. Sellwood 
testified at trial that he saw them there and that he saw Mosby remove three guns 
from a paper bag, two of which he handed to Fleming and Vanterpool. Sellwood 
also saw a long gun with a damaged handle on the counter behind Mosby. On the 
back of a chair near Mosby, he saw a towel similar to the one found near the crime 
scene. Finally, Sellwood also heard Mosby tell his codefendants that he would pick 
them up at 11:30 pm so that they could take care of “serious business.”  
 Witnesses Bernice Celestine, Eustace Sorhaindo, and Shorn Pennyfeather all 
heard gun shots the evening of the murder and saw four men dressed in black near 
Officer Hodge’s home shortly before or after his murder. Only Sorhaindo was able 
to identify at trial any of the four men he saw. He identified Mosby and another 
codefendant, Pedro Harris. He later recanted his identification of Harris, but he 
never withdrew his identification of Mosby.  
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 Two days after the murder, Sellwood again encountered Mosby. This time, 
Mosby had just been questioned by police about the murder of a police officer. 
Sellwood helped Mosby clean out New York’s Latest Fashions store and heard 
Mosby exclaim several times that he would not go to jail. Several months later, 
Sellwood encountered Mosby, Fleming, and Vanterpool. Mosby pointedly stopped 
Sellwood on the street to tell him that “whatsoever you hear in the store or 
whatsoever you see in the store, don’t ever leave me hear it or otherwise me and 
the boys them will take you out.” 
 Richardson offered two defenses at trial. First, he tried to provide an alibi for 
the evening of the murder by explaining that he was at strip clubs. Second, he 
claimed that the murder was committed by corrupt Virgin Islands police officers 
who knew that Officer Hodge was about to report them. In support of this second 
defense, Richardson offered a recording in which a person involved in the drug 
business allegedly explained to a confidential informant (“CI”) that Virgin Islands 
police officers had approached him to hire a contract killer to murder Officer 
Hodge. The person in the recording was allegedly Vargas Paniagua, who 
purportedly assisted in the murder because Officer Hodge owed Paniagua cocaine 
money. Despite Richardson’s attempts, Paniagua was not produced to testify at 
trial, the recording was not admitted into evidence, and the CI’s identity was not 
revealed.  
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 On August 19, 1996, in the Virgin Islands Superior Court,1
 The Appellate Division had jurisdiction to hear Richardson’s appeal 
pursuant to 48 U.S.C. § 1613a(a) and (d). We review the Superior Court’s rulings 
using the same standards of review as those employed by the Appellate Division. 
Semper v. Santos, 845 F.2d 1233, 1236 (3d Cir. 1988); Gov’t of Virgin Islands v. 
Lewis, 620 F.3d 359, 364 & n.4 (3d Cir. 2010). 
 a jury found 
Richardson guilty of first degree murder, conspiracy to commit murder, and 
unauthorized possession of a firearm. On November 16, 1996, the Superior Court 
denied Richardson’s motion for a judgment of acquittal or, in the alternative, a new 
trial. He then filed a timely appeal to the Appellate Division of the Virgin Islands 
District Court. Richardson v. Gov’t of Virgin Islands, No. 1997-0015-2, 2011 WL 
4357329, at *2 (D.V.I. Sept. 16, 2011) (per curiam). After an unexplained fifteen-
year delay, the Appellate Division affirmed Richardson’s conviction on January 
22, 2010. Richardson, 2011 WL 4357329, at *12. Richardson timely appealed to 
this Court. 
II 
Richardson challenges his conviction on six grounds. Three arguments relate 
to the Paniagua tape recording. Richardson argues that the Superior Court violated 
                                                 
1 At the time of trial, the trial court was known as the Territorial Court. Starting in 
October 2004, the Territorial Court became known as the Superior Court. We will 
refer to the trial court as the Superior Court.  
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his Sixth Amendment right to compulsory process when it denied his motion for a 
writ of habeas corpus ad testificandum requiring Paniagua to testify, that the 
Superior Court erred by determining that the tape was inadmissible hearsay, and 
that the Superior Court incorrectly denied his motion to disclose the identity of the 
CI who recorded the conversation. These arguments are meritless for the same 
reasons articulated in the related case of Gov’t of Virgin Islands v. Mosby, No. 11-
3676, slip op. at 6–10 (3d Cir. Jan. 30, 2013). 
Besides the Paniagua-related arguments, Richardson makes three additional 
arguments. First, he argues that Athnell Coker’s testimony recounting 
Richardson’s confession violated the rule of Bruton v. United States, 391 U.S. 123 
(1968). Richardson lacks standing to make this argument. “The rule enunciated in 
Bruton stems from the right to confrontation and is designed to protect the 
nontestifying confessor’s codefendant, not the confessor himself.” United States v. 
Morales, 477 F.2d 1309, 1316 (5th Cir. 1973). Thus, even if Coker’s testimony 
violated Bruton, it did not violate Richardson’s right to confrontation. 
Richardson also challenges the District Court’s admission of Coker’s 
testimony on the grounds that it was inadequately corroborated. This argument was 
not contemporaneously raised at trial, so we review for plain error only. United 
States v. Richards, 241 F.3d 335, 337 (3d Cir. 2001). Confessions and admissions 
of “essential elements of the crime” charged “must be corroborated.” Opper v. 
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United States, 348 U.S. 84, 90–91 (1954). A confession is corroborated if other 
evidence verifies enough of the confession “to justify a jury inference of [the 
statement’s] truth.” Id. at 93; United States v. Wilson, 436 F.2d 122, 124 (3d Cir. 
1971) (holding that a confession was trustworthy because “two parts of [the 
defendant’s] admission were corroborated by other evidence”). 
Richardson’s confession is reliable because the details of the murder he 
described were verified by physical and forensic evidence. Coker testified that 
Richardson told him that Richardson carried out the murder by going “down 
Lindberg Bay in the bushes and stake out and waited until Hodge came out of his 
house and shoot him.”  Another witness, Bernice Celestine, testified at trial that 
she saw someone place an object in a grassy area near some bushes by Hodge’s 
house, which police later discovered was a clean, recently placed towel that had 
gun residue. It looked similar to the towel Sellwood saw with Richardson’s 
codefendants earlier on the day of the murder. 
Coker also testified that Richardson shot Hodge “[w]hen [he] fall on the 
ground, [Richardson] went over him and shoot him with the shotgun.” Forensic 
evidence confirmed that Officer Hodge received one of the shotgun wounds in his 
back while he was lying face down. The details of Richardson’s confession to 
Coker are thus corroborated by other evidence, which means the Superior Court 
did not err by permitting the testimony. 
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Lastly, Richardson challenges the sufficiency of the evidence supporting 
each of his convictions. “The burden on a defendant who raises a challenge to the 
sufficiency of the evidence is extremely high.” United States v. Piekarsky, 687 
F.3d 134, 146 (3d Cir. 2012) (citations omitted). Reviewing the evidence in “the 
light most favorable to the Government,” id., we will affirm the conviction “if 
there is substantial evidence from which any rational trier of fact could find guilt 
beyond a reasonable doubt.” United States v. Brown, 3 F.3d 673, 680 (3d Cir. 
1993) (quoting United States v. Frorup, 963 F.2d 41, 42 (3d Cir. 1992)) (internal 
quotation mark omitted). 
Coker’s testimony is sufficient to support Richardson’s convictions for first 
degree murder and unauthorized possession of a firearm. A defendant can be 
convicted of first degree murder for murdering the victim by “lying in wait . . . or 
by any other willful, deliberate and premeditated killing.” 14 V.I. Code 
§ 922(a)(1). Richardson told Coker that he participated in the murder of Officer 
Hodge by waiting “in the bushes and stake out and waited until Hodge came out of 
his house.” A person can be convicted of unauthorized possession of a firearm if 
the Government shows that the person is not authorized to have a firearm and that 
the person possessed a firearm. 14 V.I. Code § 2253(a). Richardson concedes that 
he was not authorized to possess a firearm, and the possession element is satisfied 
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by Coker’s testimony that Richardson gave him the sawed-off shotgun that they 
buried together. 
 Regarding Richardson’s conspiracy conviction, “[t]o prove a conspiracy, the 
government must establish a unity of purpose between the alleged conspirators, an 
intent to achieve a common goal, and an agreement to work together toward that 
goal.” United States v. Gibbs, 190 F.3d 188, 197 (3d Cir. 1999) (citation omitted). 
These three elements can be proved “entirely by circumstantial evidence.” Id. 
(citation omitted). There are three pieces of circumstantial evidence that adequately 
support Richardson’s conspiracy conviction. First, four guns were used by more 
than one person. Second, witnesses testified that they saw four men dressed in 
black arrive together in a truck near Officer Hodge’s home close to the time of the 
murder. Third, three of Richardson’s codefendants were seen earlier on the day of 
the murder distributing guns similar to those used in the murder while discussing 
“a serious job to do” later that same evening. This evidence shows that the murder 
was the product of multiple people who shared the common goal of murdering 
Officer Hodge. 
 Even though this evidence lacks a direct connection between Richardson and 
his codefendants, a reasonable juror could infer that he was a part of the 
conspiracy. “Once the existence of a conspiracy is clearly established, slight 
evidence may be sufficient to connect a defendant with it.” United States v. 
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De Calvalcante, 440 F.2d 1264, 1273 (3d Cir. 1971) (quoting United States v. 
Cohen, 197 F.2d 26, 29 (3d Cir. 1954)). Here, the testimony showing Richardson’s 
codefendants together and acting as if they had an agreement to kill Hodge is 
sufficient for a jury to conclude that a conspiracy existed. This makes Richardson’s 
confession to the murder sufficient to show that he was also a part of that 
conspiracy. The contrary conclusion—that he happened to show up to kill Officer 
Hodge at the same time and place as three other people—is preposterous. The 
evidence was thus sufficient to support his conspiracy conviction as well as his 
murder and firearm possession convictions. 
III 
 For these reasons, we will affirm Richardson’s convictions. 
